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NOTES
THE DILEMMA OF ADOPTEES IN THE CLASS GIFT
STRUCTURE-THE KENTUCKY APPROACH:
A RULE WITHOUT REASON
I.

INTRODUCI'ON

Adoption is one of the oldest and most widely employed of legal
fictions' that establishes the legal relationship of parent and child
between persons not so related by blood.2 While somewhat of a rarity
within the United States fifty years ago, today adoption has become
an accepted part of American culture3 and has developed into a highly
sophisticated social tool which is being utilized with increasing
frequency. The importance of adoption as an institution becomes
readily apparent when examined in light of both the number of children
adopted each year and the amount of revenue expended annually by
governmental units in support of child welfare services.4 Unfortunately, while the number of adoptions has steadily risen over the last
four decades statutes pertaining to the inheritance rights of adopted
persons have been unable to keep pace with the changing social
fabric.
The modem approach to adoption is to sever all ties between the
adoptee and his natural parents and to transplant the child into his
adoptive family with all the rights of a natural child.5 Such statutory
schemes deny the natural parents any rights in relation to the child's
estate and at the same time extinguish the child's claim to the estate of
his natural parents. A majority of jurisdictions specify that the adoptive
child may inherit from his adopted parents, and where the right to
' See Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modem, 9 VAND. L.
743 (1956).

REv.

2R. PxmiaL, K EN'ucxr FALY LAw § 29.6 (1969).
3
Polier, ParentalRights: The Need for Law and Social Action, reprinted in

F. HmARP,

PROBLms OF

=

FAmLY [hereinafter PROBLEMS OF Tm FAMIy]

204 (2962).
4 Recent statistical evidence reveals a substantial increase in the number of
adoptions over te last few years. In 1964 for example, official U.S. government

figures indicate that over 135,000 children were adopted in the United States. This
Of this figure
over by
thenon-relatives.
preceding year.
a 6.4children
percentwere
increase
total
represented
53 percent
or 71,600
adopted
In Kentucky
a one
over 1,500 adoptions were reported in the year 1964.
Like the ever increasing number of adoptions, so too has the the cost of
providing child welfare services skyrocketed. In the ten-year period from 1956
to 1965, state and local government expenditures for the support of child welfare
agencies nearly tripled. Since 1936, federal grants-in-aid to states for child welfare
services has grown from a mere 625,000 dollars to a figure of over 34 million
dollars. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & WELFAE ADMINISTRATION CmLDREN's BUREAU,

WELARE STATIsTcs No. 84 (1966).
CHLD
5
PROBLEMS OF THE FAmy, supra note 3, at 214.
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inherit is not so provided the courts have interpreted the statutes so
as to bring the adoptee into the line of inheritance. 6 However, even
in jurisdictions in which the parent-child relationship is created between children and their adoptive parents, courts have been reluctant
to recognize the right of an adopted child to inherit through as well
as from its adoptive parents (i.e., the courts permit the adopted child
to inherit from the adopting parent but are not generally willing to
allow the adopted child to inherit from the relatives of the adopting
parent) absent clear statutory language. 7 The theory is that the personal relationship created between the adoptive parents and the child
does not automatically create the same legal status between the child
and the relatives of the adoptive parents. 8 As a result, while the
adopted child is generally permitted to inherit by intestacy from his
adoptive parents, the other ramifications of the effect of adoption on
inheritance have remained for the most part unresolved by the courts
and ignored by our statutes. 9
One such problem area, and the one with which we are here
primarily concerned involves the status of the adopted child under
a will, trust or other document. These questions are more frequently
litigated and involve, in most instances, a greater amount of wealth.
A typical situation may be illustrated by assuming that X, by will or
trust, conveys Blackacre to Y for life, remainder over at X's death to
Xs "children," "issue," "heirs," or "descendants." X adopts a child and
the issue is whether the adoptee, on X's death takes under the class
gift. Questions of this sort depend upon X's intent rather than on the
application of the local statutes of descent and distribution, although
such statutes may have some bearing on X's intent since they express
the state's public policy. Of course, there are many factual and policy
considerations upon which any given case may ultimately turn such
as the terminology employed, the age of the person adopted, whether
or not the transferor had knowledge of the adoption and many more
to be later examined. It is the purpose of this note to review the
inheritance rights of adoptive persons tender class gifts in general,
with specific emphasis upon their legal status in Kentucky and to
suggest a specific course of reform in areas where it is sorely needed.
61d. at 215.
71n re Estate of Smith, 326 P.2d 400 (Utah 1958); Gamble v. Cloud, 82
So.2d 526 (Ala. 1955); In re Will of Hodge, 60 N.E.2d 540 (N.Y. 1945).
8 See Merritt v. Morton, 136 S.W. 133 (Ky. 1911); In re Hayes' Estate, 86
P.2d 424 (Ore. 1939).

9 A. Gurumx, E. CLARK, L. LusKY,
GnATurrous TRAsxas 83(1967).

& A. MuRPHY,
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II.

BACKGROuND

Adoption was a common practice among the ancient Babylonians, 0

Greeks and Egyptians1 1 and was apparently utilized at an early date
by the Indian tribes on this continent. 2 At Roman law, which is the
unquestioned source of our modem adoption statutes, the practice was
employed solely for the benefit of the adoptive family and was designed to avoid not only the extinction of the family name but also
to perpetuate the rites of family religious worship. 13 Adoption under
the Romans developed into two distinct forms known as adrogation
and adoption. Adrogation was the adoption of an adult who was sui
generis and independent and was accomplished by a special act of
the Patrician assembly.' 4 Adoption, on the other hand, was the legal
act whereby a person who was the head of the family relinquished his
position as father over a child to another.' 5 The process of adoption
did not require a formal legislative act but merely consisted of the
appearance of all parties concerned before a magistrate.1 6
By the time of Justinian, Roman law evolved into a sophisticated
code which prohibited individuals from adopting others if they had
living issue or were capable of producing offspring.' 7 Once adopted,
however, the adoptee became a member of his adoptive family and
broke all ties with his natural parents.' 8 He took the name of the
adoptor and became legally entitled to inherit from him while retaining
his right of succession in his own natural family. 19 Today, much of
the old Roman adoption laws remain preserved in the modem statutes
of the civil law countries of Europe.
In England where the Roman impact was less significant, the
practice of adoption was unknown and common law development
literally ignored it.20 Hence, the act of adoption throughout the British
10 The Code of Hammurabi which dates from 2285 states in part that, "If
a man takes a child in his name, adopt and rear him as a son, this grown-up son
may not be demanded back; if a man adopt a child as his son, and after he has
taken him he trnsgress against his foster-father, that adopted son shall return to the
house of his own father.' See A. KocoumcK & J. WIGMoRE, EVOLUnON OF LAW,
SonacEs oF ANcim-r AN PnmaivE LAW [hereinafter KocotrcK & WIGMOBE].
11
Note, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 332, 333 (1922).
'2 See Comment, 29 Ky. L. J.481 (1940-41).
Is See 22 COLum. L. REV. supranote 11, at 332.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.

17 Kocouncx & WiGMoE, supra note 10, at 345.

18 Id.at 346.

19 See 22 CoLum. L. REv. supranote 11, at 334.
20 2 F. Por.rocK & F. MArLAND, THE HIsToRY OF ENcmsH LAW 399 (2d ed.

1911).

KENTucKY LAw JourNAL

[Vol. 59

Commonwealth and in the United States is regulated entirely by
statute. 21 This is not to say that adoption was non-existent in England,
as the rearing of foster children was not at all uncommon. The
relationship was treated as if the children were the natural issue of
the foster parents, but they received no separate legal recognition and
so were not entitled to inherit from their adoptive parents.2 2 To the
English courts the term "heirs" was construed to mean only legitimate
23
children who were heirs of the blood.
The precedent established by the English judiciary was consistently
followed by American courts long after this country's separation from
Great Britain. As a consequence, adoption as we know it was not
permitted in the United States until Mississippi enacted the first
statute on the subject in 184624 followed closely by Massachusetts
in 1851.25 Early legislative attempts, however, tended to emphasize
only the necessary qualifications for adoption and the procedures
which had to be followed in order for the adoption to become effective.26 Since the tendency of the courts was to favor blood relatives
over adoptees, the neglect on the part of early state legislators to
precisely define the status of adopted children in relation to their
new families resulted in many adoptees being excluded from the right
to inherit. This initial preoccupation with procedural requirements
was probably due to questions of inheritance being considered of
secondary importance to the humanitarian objective of providing for
the welfare of adopted children.27 Whatever the reasoning embodied
in the early statutes, its vestiges remain in modem adoption legislation.
Insofar as coming to grips with the problem of allowing adopted
children to inherit through as well as from their adoptive parents,
most state legislatures have not spoken clearly and absent express
statutory provision, the courts have been reluctant to permit it.28 While
the trend of modem legislation is in the direction of permitting adoptees
to inherit through as well as from their adoptive parents it may well
take many years before this practice and others more in tune with
21
The first English statute on adoption was enacted in 1926. Adoption of
Children's Act, 16 & 17, Geo. 5, c. 29 (1926).
22 Huard, supra note 1, at 746.
23 Id. at 745, 746.
24 Id. at 748. Both Louisiana and Texas preceded Mississippi in point of time
but were governed under the civil law which remained as a vestige of French and
Spanish
2 5 rule. Id.
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 824 (1851).
26
See Ky. STAT. § 2071 (1892) which is typical of early adoption statutes.
27
Early American statutes departed from the basic concepts of Roman law in
that the primary concern under state laws was for the welfare of the child. Huard,
supra note 1, at 749.
28 Cf. PROBLEMS OF THE FAMmLY, supra note 3, at 215.
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modern social concepts are accepted widely. In the meantime the
burden of dealing with the multiplicity of issues raised by adoption
rests squarely upon the shoulders of the courts.
III. RuLEs OF CONSThUCnON APPLICABLE TO Crss G-rs
A. In General

In attempting to deternine the meaning of language in private
29
instruments the intent of the transferor is of primary importance.
Indeed the sole function of the court is to discover and give effect to
the transferor's intent as expressed in the document.3 0 Thus, where the
intention of the transferor to include or exclude adopted children is
manifested in the instrument the court will uphold it and will not
resort to rules of construction.31 Of course, it is not always possible to
ascertain the transferor's intent by merely reading the instrument.
In these situations the court must place itself in the shoes of the
transferor so as to determine the intention inferred from the language
or testamentary scheme, interpreted in light of the surrounding facts
and circumstances and other extrinsic evidence.32 In most cases involving the inheritance rights of adoptive children, however, it is
reasonable to assume that the testator had no actual intent to either
include or exclude the adoptee. If such an intent had been present at
the time the instrument was drafted or executed the testator's predisposition would most certainly have been expressed in more explicit
terminology. On occasion such latent ambiguities can be resolved by
resorting to extrinsic evidence which reveals a specific intention on
the part of the testator.33 In most cases, however, there are few
persuasive clues as to what the transferor would desire and the court
must therefore rely on the applicable rules of construction. While
some rules of construction are based largely upon what it is thought
that the typical testator would intend, other such rules have their basis
primarily in some general policy which is fostered by the law. 34 Thus,
it is obvious that in many cases effect is likely to be given to a meaning
that was probably never in the testator's mind. Nevertheless, courts
cannot realistically be expected to perform the impossible task of
29

30

Prewitt v. Prewitt's Ex'rs., 199 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1945).

Davidson v. Davidson, 117 N.E.2d 769 (III. 1954).

31 Cf. T. AarnsoN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS [hereinafter ATKINSON]

§ 146(2d ed. 1953).
* See generally 4 PACE ON THE LAW OF WILs [hereinafter LAw or WILLs]
§§ 30.6 -.10 (Bowe-Parker Rev. ed. 1961).
33 In re Ward's Will, 195 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959), aff'd, 174
N.E.2d 826 (N.Y. 1961).
34 Cf. ATKINSON, supra note 31, at § 146.
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reading the decedent's mind and must of necessity look to specific
rules of construction which have been developed in the course of
certain recurring fact situations. The resulting "intent" which is determined by the court and attributed to the testator is in essence a
combination of both judicially envisioned social desirability and conjecture as to what the testator probably would have intended had he
thought about the matter. 35 The outcome of any given case depends
upon a number of interplaying factors which vary in weight depending
upon the circumstances.A6 Was the testator the adopter of the child?
When did the adoption take place in relation to the execution of the
instrument? Was the testator aware of the adoption and was he aware
of the probable legal consequences of class designation in relation to
the adoptee? Thus, the present law is most readily understood by an
examination of the various rules of construction governing the rights
of adoptees under various fact situations, as defined in terms of recurring combinations of language and circumstances.
B. Effects of Statutes

As might be anticipated, certain statutory provisions pervade the
entire subject of inheritance rights of adoptees. The statutes of
primary importance are those pertaining to the act of adoption and
its legal consequences and the applicable statutes of descent and
distribution. The statutes of descent and distribution are of importance to the extent that some general public policy contained therein may provide the basis for a presumption or an inference in determining the intention to be attributed to the testator whose actual intent,
if any, is not known.3 7 As to the actual adoption statutes themselves,
they may serve to define the status created by the act of adoption and
are therefore relevant to any inquiry as to the recognized relationship
between the adoptee and his adoptive family.
It has been suggested by at least one commentator that adoption
statutes affect the construction of private instruments in at least three
ways.38 First, the statute by its very terms may more or less prescribe
the effect which adoption will have with respect to identification
under particular designations in private instruments. For example,
the statute may provide that the word "child" or its equivalent in any
instrument shall include an adopted child unless the contrary plainly
5
3 Oler, Construction of Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are
Concerned, 43 MICH. L. REv. 705, 708-09 (1945).

36 Id.
37 Cf.
PROPERTY]
38

5 A. CAsm,

AaMERCAN LAw OF PnoPEarY [hereinafter LAw or

§ 22.57 (1952).
Oler, supra note 35, at 709-10.

NoTEs
appears by the terms of the instrument. At present, the legislatures
in Pennsylvania 9 and several other states 40 have enacted statutes
which deal specifically with the rights of adoptees to inherit under
class gifts. The Pennsylvania act provides that:
Whenever in a will a bequest or devise shall be made to the child
or children of any person other than the testator without naming

such child or children, such bequest or devise shall be construed
to include any adopted child or children of such other person who

were adopted before the date of the will, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.

Second, by investing an adoptee with a particular status and
nothing more, such as that of an "heir" of the adopting parents, the
statute may, when viewed in conjunction with the principle of construction-whereby words are normally construed according to their
plain meaning-have an exclusionary effect in that the adoptee is not
within the designation employed in the will. For instance, if the
adoptee is designated as an "heir" in the statute but the relationship
of parent and child is not otherwise created, the statute exerts a
negative force which excludes the adoptee from taking under a gift
to the children of the adopter.
Third, the statute may have an inclusionary effect where the
particular status of "child" of the adopter is created. Thus, if the
statute creates a parent-child relationship and invests the adoptee
with all the rights of a child born in lawful wedlock, it will be given
* due weight by the courts in determining whether or not the adoptee
should be permitted to take under a gift to the adopter's "children."
If no surrounding circumstances exist which reveal the testator's
actual predisposition, a court might well consider the statute to supply
testator's actual intent. At this point it may be well to remember that
the vast majority of courts still favor blood relatives over adoptees 41
and that where the statutes are not explicit, adoptees will usually not
42
be permitted to inherit.
C. Resort To Language and Circumstances
In the typical situation where the question is whether an adopted
child is included by reference in a will to X's "children," "issue," "heirs"
30

PUIDON'S PENNA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, ch. 2, § 228 (1957).
See e.g. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 45 Ch.778 § 45-65a (1960); GA. CODE
ANN. tit. 45 § 74-414 (1964); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 8, § 14 (1961).
41 Cf. RESTATEMENT oF POPERTY § 265, comment (d), at 287 (1940).
42
40

The continued reluctance of the courts to interpret adoption statutes more
broadly so as to include adoptees within gifts to classes such as "children" etc. is
probably due to the old maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be given a narrow construction.
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or other relations, the language employed may in itself be sufficiently
clear to decide the question. There is a presumption that nontechnical
words which are used in a will are used in their usual popular meaning
and technical terms are used in their technical sense. 43 If in the
popular or technical meaning of the word there is a connotation of
blood relationship, the term itself will be persuasive against inclusion
of an adoptee within it. On the other hand, if the term which
designates the class has acquired a statutory significance independent
of implications of consanguinity, it can operate in favor of including
an adoptee within the designation. An example of a frequently employed word which has acquired an independent statutory significance
is the term "heirs" which depends upon the law of intestate succession
for its definition. In large measure of course the entire matter is one
of definition and as such is subject to the tyranny of the definer.
1. Gifts to Children
type
of gift to a class is one where the transThe most common
ferees are described as the "children" of some designated person.44
As a general rule, if the transferor is the parent of an adopted child,
a devise or bequest to the transferor's own "children," "issue," "heir"
etc. will be held to include the adoptee. 45 In this situation inclusion
of the adoptee within the class seems justified since most persons who
would have enough affection for a child to adopt it as their own
would probably intend that it should be included in a reference to
their children.46 An exception to the general rule has been recognized,
however, when the adopter is also the natural grandparent of the
adopted child. In such cases the problem which arises is the possibility
that the adoptee will receive double shares. Here, courts have usually
taken the position that the child may receive only his share as a
grandchild. 47 Another situation in which the rights of a testators
adopted child are in doubt is when the adoption takes place between
the time the instrument was executed and the testators death. While
the law is not completely clear in this area, courts have generally
been favorable toward including the adopted child within the class
gift,48 notwithstanding the fact that it can no longer be argued that
43 4

LAw or

WILLS,

supranote 32, at § 30.21.

44 5 LAw OF PnOPERTY, supra note 37, at § 22.30.
See e.g. In re Barbarita's Trust 190 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959);
Virgin v. Marwick, 55 A. 520 (Me. 1903); BERGIN & HASKEL, PREFACE TO
ESTATEs N LAND AND FuTurE INTERESTs 234 (1966).
46 Cf. Wildman's Appeal, 151 A. 265 (Conn. 1930).
47
4 8 Einstein v. Michaelson, 177 N.Y.S. 474 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919).
E.g., Young v. Stearns, 125 N.E. 697 (Mass. 1920).
4 6
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the testator must have had the child in mind when he executed the
will.
When the testator is not the adopting parent, however, there is
a presumption against the inclusion of the adopted child within the
primary meaning of the word "children."49 This so-called "strangerto-the-adoption" doctrine50 may be illustrated by a disposition "to X
for life, remainder to the children of X". The issue of course is whether
a child adopted by X qualifies as one of the children of X. The result
depends upon the intention of the testator but, since he probably had
no intention either to include or exclude the adoptee, the intention
which the law will attribute to him is of primary importance. At
present, courts tend to believe that when a "stranger-to-the-adoption"
makes a bequest or devise to the "children" of another, he only had in
mind the lawful children of the body of the person designated. 51 On
the other hand, adopted children are presumptively included where the
testator knew that the parent had adopted a child when the instrument
52
was executed.
2. Gifts to Issue and Descendants
Under the early English common law a testamentary gift to "issue'
was construed to mean that all legitimate lineal descendants of every
degree took per capita.53 This construction of course precluded
adopted children from taking as they were not recognized at common
law for inheritance purposes. The modem trend in American law,
however, is to limit those who would inherit under the term "issue
to those who would take as such under the applicable statute of
descent and distribution.5 4 While such a construction would presumably permit adopted children to come within the designated class
of "Issue" in states where the statutes treat adopted persons as the
natural children of the adopter for all purposes, this is not always
the case. The words "issue" and "children" are not synonymous and
a statute which raises the adoptee to the status of "natural child"
does not make the adoptee "issue" or a "descendant." 55 As one court
49 5 LAVw oF PROPERTy, supra note

37, at § 22.34.

50 This doctrine provides that a limitation in a deed or will to a "child" or
"children" is not deemed to include an adopted child where the grantor or testator
is a stranger to the adoption. Ahlemeyer v,Miller, 131 A. 54, 56 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1925).
51 Cf. 5 LAw or PnoPEarY, supra note 37, at § 22.34.
5
2L. Smms, HANOOK OF rm LAw OF Furouna ImraEEsTs § 105 (1966).

53 Id.

54 Id.
55 But see Washington's adoption statute which provides expressly that an
adoptee shall be deemedto be the 'issue" of the adopter. WA.sH. REV. CODE tit. 26,
§ 26.32.140 (1955).
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put it, "There is no such person as issue by adoption." 56 It has also
been held that although the statute makes the adoptee the child of
the adopter, it does not make him a descendant.5 7 The reasoning
behind this construction is that etymologically the word "issue" tends
to imply a physical springing from the ancestor and not from an
adoption.58 The term "descendants" has also been construed to connote a blood relationship to the exclusion of adoptees.5 9
The more logical position and the one taken by most courts is
that where a statute creates a parent-child relationship between the
adopter and adoptee, the latter is by virtue of the statute presumptively
within the designation of the adopters "issue" or "descendants" unless
the context or circumstances establish a contrary intention. 60
3. Gifts to Heirs and Next of Kin
Unlike the construction given to class gifts under the designation
of "children", "issue", or "descendants" when the transferor is a
"stranger-to-the-adoption", courts generally permit adoptees to take
under gifts to the adopting parent's "heirs" or "next-of-kin." The
rationale behind this difference in treatment of the terms "heirs" or
"next of kin" is that they are regarded as having a prima facie reference to those who take under the applicable laws of descent and
distribution."' For example, if A devises property to his brother, B,
for life, remainder "to the heirs of B", B's adopted children will share
in the remainder interest because under the laws of intestacy in all
states, 62 he is an heir of B, whose heirs are designated. If, on the
other hand, the transferor had designated his own "heirs" or his own
"next of kin" the right of the adopted children of another person to
share in the gift is by no means certain. For instance, assume that A
conveyed property in trust for himself for life, remainder to "my [As]
heirs". If upon A's death he left no descendants, the adopted children
of A's deceased brother would be excluded in a number of states
even though the natural children of the brother would take as A's
56

In re Cuddeback's Will, 20 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. 1940).

57 Hale v. Hale, 237 Ill. App. 410 (1925).
58 See Dulfon v. Keasbey, 162 A. 102 (N.J.

1932); Miller v. Wick, 142 N.E.
490 (I.
1924).
5
9In
re Dudley's Estate, 6 N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. 1938).
0
In re Holden's Trust, 291 N.W. 104 (Minn. 1940); In re Truman, 61 A.
1905).
598 (R.I.
61
E.g., Bedinger v. Graybill's Ex'r, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957); Dickenson
v. Buck, 192 S.E. 748 (Va. 1937). See also Casner, Construction of Gifts to Heirs
and the
Like, 53 HAnv. L. REv. 207 208-09.
62
Note, Property Rights as Affected by Adoption, 25

242-46 (1959).

BRoox-LN L.

1Ev. 231,
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heirs. 63 In these situations the case may depend on whether or not
the brother's adopted children would be eligible to take A's intestate
property, which in turn depends upon whether adoptees take through
as well as from their adopting parents under the applicable statute.
These cases, however, are not necessarily controlled by the laws of
intestate succession even where the instrument refers to the "heirs"
of the adoptive parent. This is because these questions are governed
by the testators intention and may occassionally result in the conclusion that "heirs" was used by the particular testator to mean
"children" and that the exclusionary rule applicable to that term
should apply. 64 Usually, however, the courts which reach this result
have done so by not treating this language as referring to the statutes
of descent and distribution, so that the general exclusionary presumption applies.6 5
IV.

Ricis

OF MINoR ADOPTEES IN KENmc

The status of adoptive children under class gifts in Kentucky is,
at present, not entirely certain. The reasons for the existing uncertainties are several and include among others the marked effect
of judicial decisions regarding the rights of adoptees under the statute
of descent and distribution and the overwhelming influence of the
statute which defines the legal status of adoptive children.
The current statute, KENTucKY REviSED STATuTES [hereinafter KRS]
§199.530(2), as amended in 1956, defines the status of adoptive children
as follows:
From and after the date of the judgment the child shall be deemed
the child of petitioners and shall be considered for purposes of
inheritance and succession and for all other legal considerations,
the natural, legitimate child of the parents adopting it the same
as if born of their bodies. Except where a natural parent is the
spouse of an adopted parent an adopted child from the time of
adoption shall have no legal relationship to its birth parents in
respect to either personal or property rights. 66
Under Kentucky's 1940 statute6 7 and two subsequent amendments 68
6 3 See

e g In re Estate of Slavens, 149 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956);

Brown
64 v. WrigKt 80 N.E. 612 (Mass. 1907).

Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 24 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. 1943); Cook v. Underwood, 228

N.W. 629 (Iowa 1930).
6o g Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood, 74 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1947); In 'e
Estate of Clarke, 251 N.W. 279 (Neb. 1933).
66 Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.520(2) (1956) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
67K
S § 405.200 (1940).
68
In both 1946 and 1950 the statute was renumbered, i.e. KRS § 405.340
(1946), and KIRS § 199.580(2) (1950).
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thereto, the Court of Appeals interpreted language substantially similar
to that contained in the existing act to allow an adopted child to
inherit through as well as from his adoptive parents 9 and dicta in
at least two decisions rendered since the 1956 amendments lend persuasive support to the conclusion that an identical construction would
be given to the existing law.70 With respect to the right of an adoptee
to take as a beneficiary under class gifts, however, a good deal more
confusion arises. Whether or not an adoptee will be included depends
primarily upon the terminology employed to designate the class and
the intent the court will attribute to the testator.7 1 In recent years
adoptive children have been held to be presumptively included within
the designations "children", "heirs", "heirs at law" and 'legal heirs" 72
though controversial holdings in several recent cases7 3 have raised
some uncertainty as to what age group is to be permitted to take
under the term "children". In order to gain an adequate understanding
of the present law as it pertains to the inheritance rights of adoptive
children under class gifts in Kentucky, however, it is imperative that
the applicable case law and the statutory structure upon which it
rests be subjected to analysis in a historical context.
While acknowledging at an early date that such terms as "children",
"issue", and "kindred" were not necessarily confined to those born in
lawful wedlock or related by blood, 74 the Court of Appeals consistently
refused to permit an adoptee to inherit through as well as from his
adoptive parents. The Court's views were perhaps most clearly spelled
out in the case of Merritt v. Morton.7 5 In that case W. W. Merritt
and his wife entered into a contract of adoption with the Louisville
Baptist Orphan's Home whereby they adopted an infant son. After
the execution of the contract Merritt and his wife reared the child
until he reached the age of majority. At sometime prior to 1910 the
adoptee's foster mother died, followed closely in death by her own
mother, Sarah Morton, who died intestate. The adoptee asserted that
he was entitled, by virtue of his adoption, to take by representation
69Kolb
v. Buhl's Adm'r, 198 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1946).
7
oWhile the precise question as to whether an adoptive child may inherit
through as well as from his adoptive parents has not reached the Court of Appeals
since the enactment of KRS § 199.520(2), the Court has implied by way of aicta

that the rule remains applicable. Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965);
Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
71 R. Petrilli,KENTUCKY FAMILy LAW, § 29.25 (1969).
72 Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965).
73 See Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Co., 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967); Pennington v. Citizens Fidelity Bank, 390 S.W.2d 671 (1965); Edmands v. Tice, 324
S.W.2d
491 (Ky. 1959).
74
Power v. Haley, 4 S.W. 683 (1887); Drain v. Violett, 65 Ky. Rep. (2 Bush)
155 (Ky. 1867).
75

186 S.W. 133 (Ky. 1911).
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the share of the estate to which his foster mother would have been
entitled. The Court, while recognizing that an adoptive child was
considered the heir at law of his adoptive parents, 76 concluded that
the act of adoption was a contractual arrangement and therefore binding only upon the parties thereto. All inheritance laws, the Court
pointed out, are based upon the natural ties of blood relationships,
whereas the right of an adopted child to inherit is based solely upon
contract.
The rule expounded in Merritt continued to preclude adoptive children from inheriting from collaterals of their adoptive parents until
the General Assembly enacted legislation in 194077 which superseded

the former adoption statute thereby undercutting the reasoning upon
which Merritt was based. The precipitating factor which led to the
legislative demise of the rule contained in Merritt was the Court's
78
holding in Sanders v. Adams.
In Sanders, the testator devised two tracts of land to his daughter
for life, remainder to her children should she have any. In the event
she died without children the property was to be divided between the
testator's two other daughters who were themselves adequately provided for under another part of the will. The life tenant, being
incapable of bearing offspring adopted two minor daughters, who at
the life tenant's death claimed the remainder interest as children by
virtue of their adoption. The Court, in holding for the life tenant's
sisters to the exclusion of her adoptive children stressed the fact that
the testator, being a "stranger-to-the-adoption", should not have his
property diverted from the natural course of descent without expression of such intent.
It is both interesting and appalling that the Court in Sanders cited
Merritt v. Morton,79 as controlling in this situation.
It is our conclusion, in accord with the ruling in the Merritt case,
that the fact of Martha Schooler Route's adoption of these two
children, while effective to make them her own heirs with the
right to inherit from her, was ineffective to extend to the adopted
children the right to inherit through her from others who were
not parties to the contract of adoption.
78 Under the adoption statute then in effect the adoptee became the heir at
law of the adopter if the adopter wished to have such a status created. Since the

rights of both adopter and adoptee were fixed in the adoption contract it was apparently possible to adopt a person while at the same time withholding from him
the right to inherit. The statute, Ky. GEN. STAT. ch. 31, § 17 (1878), provided
only that the court granting the adoption had the power to make the adoptee the
heir at law of the adopter.
77 KRS § 405.200 (1940).
78 128 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1939).
79 Id. at 226, 227.
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In Merritt, the sole issue before the Court was the right of an
adoptive child to inherit by the laws of intestate succession through
his foster mother. The Sanders case, on the other hand, involved a
class gift to "children" under a will. In Merritt the adoptee was indeed
seeking to take through his foster mother. He was claiming a share of
her mother's estate by representation as the child of his adoptive
mother. No such analogous situation was involved in the Sanders
case. The remainderman under a private instrument does not take
through the life tenant as representative. Rather, the gift to him
is complete upon the execution of the will, trust or deed. Thus, in
Sanders the only question for the Court was whether or not the
adoptees should be included within the term "children". As discussed
earlier in this paper, it is not the rule of succession upon intestacy nor
the statute which creates the status of adoptive children which controls, but the intent of the testator as expressed in the instrument.80
If no such intent is expressed to either include or exclude the adoptee,
in accordance with long standing rules of construction, the Court
should place itself in the shoes of the testator 8l and resort to extrinsic
evidence to determine whether the testator has some predisposition
one way or the other. When this is done, and no dominant intent
can be found, the Court should then look to the statutes for the
applicable public policy and then after weighing all factors involved
attribute an intent to the testator. In Sanders the Court ignored
these long standing rules of construction and, when no intent was
present on the face of the will, turned to a case which was not
applicable for the basis of formulating a presumption adverse to the
rights of adopted children.
If the Court had wished to deny the claim of the adoptive children
it should have followed the procedural steps outlined above. As a
result of not adhering to accepted practice the Court of Appeals unfortunately established a pattern for deciding these cases which gives
undue weight to the language of statutes and the rules of intestacy
with resulting neglect of the testators predisposition toward the
matter.
In an apparent reaction to the result reached by the Court in
Sanders, the General Assembly enacted KRS § 405.200 which set
out in more precise language the legal status of adoptees.8 2 The new
statute provided in part that an adopted child was to be "considered
80

See notes 29-31 supra.
ATKiNSON, supra note 31, at § 146.
"Any child ado pted according to this chapter shall he considered for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal consequences the natural
legitimate child of the parents adopting it." XRS1§ 405.200(l) (1940).
81

82
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for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal
consequences the natural legitimate child of the parents adopting it."
The first case decided under the KRS § 405.200 was Kolb v. Ruhrs
Adm'r.83 In that case John Ruhl died intestate, his only heirs at law
being the children and grandchildren of the deceased's uncles and
aunts. In reversing a lower court decision which had denied the claim
of an adopted cousin of Ruhl, that she should inherit by representation,
the share of her adoptive mother, Chief Justice Rees, writing for the
majority, stated that the recently adopted statute "obviously was
enacted to change the existing law as construed by this Court." The
Court went on to say that under the statute an adopted child could
not inherit through as well as from his adoptive parents.
The enactment of the 1940 statute had no immediate direct effect
upon the rights of adoptees as beneficiaries under class gifts. In the
two cases which reached the Court within the first thirteen years after
its adoption it was held that the statute was inapplicable in that the
proper statute to construe in cases involving class gifts was the
statute in effect at the time of the adoption. 84 This rule was later
reversed in the case of Major v. Kammer 5 so that the statute in force,
at the termination of the intermediate estate, is construed to ascertain
class membership under generic terms.
Since the Kammer decision the Court has determined on the basis
of statutory language, both prior and subsequent to the 1956 amended
statute, that adoptive children are presumed to be included under
certain designations in class gifts unless a contrary intent appears in
the instrument.8 6
While the present presumption operates to the advantage of
adopted children its application is not fundamentally sound. In
effect the Court is now employing the same erroneous reasoning it
relied upon in the Sanders case but reaching a different result. While
the correctness of the result itself cannot be argued, the Court has
continued to place too much emphasis upon the language of the
statute and its effect upon intestacy.
Under the system of patchwork presumptions now employed, the
Court compares the terminology employed in the instrument to
designate the class with the language contained in the statute. If
the generic term in the instrument seems to fall within the bounds
198 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1946).
Copeland v. State Bank & Trust Co., 188 S.W.2d 1017 (Ky. 1945); Eversole
v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 182 S.W.2dl 392 (Ky. 194).
85 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
86
Wilson v. Johnson, 889 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1965); Isaccs v. Manning, 227
S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1950).
83
84
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of statutory language or policy, the adoptee is deemed to be included
within the term and the presumption in favor of including adoptees
is thereby expanded piecemeal. Unfortunately, this method of interpretation is not sound, as the draftsman is required to second
guess what the Court will do when a slightly different term appears
in an instrument. Thus, the adoptee's rights to take are not fully
guaranteed nor are the probable expectations of testators.
In the recent case of Heller v. Chapmans7 the Court of Appeals
held that the terms "begotten by and born unto him" contained in a
will evidenced an intent on the part of the testator not to include an
adopted child. While the result may or may not have been correct,
it certainly could not easily have been predicted by an observer who
had scrutinized other recent opinions of the Court on this subject.
In past decisions the Court of Appeals has sought inspiration in the
definition of terminology from the literal wording of the statute and
its effect upon intestate succession with resulting neglect to the
testators intent as inferred from the instrument. Thus Heller ignores
KRS § 199.520(2) which provides that adoptive children shall be considered the same as if born of the bodies of their adoptive parents.
In view of the Court's inconsistent approach to the problem as
well as the lack of predictability in its decisions, a change in judicial
method would seem to be in order. It is well recognized that these
problems arise for the most part because transferors and their attorneys
fail to take them into account when the instrument is being drafted.
Thus, sound rules of construction are imperative so as to assist rather
than obstruct the draftsman. It is submitted that in light of the
necessity to aid the draftsman and implement the strong social policy
which seeks to effectuate a complete transplantation of the adoptive
child within his new family, the Court should seriously consider
abandoning its present piecemeal approach in favor of a sound presumption which would embrace adoptive children within all class
designations unless a contrary intent is expressly stated in the instrument. Such a presumption would be invaluable from the standpoint
of the draftsman in that the construction which would ultimately be
given the instrument would be known at the date of the document's
execution. In addition, the aforementioned social policy would be
furthered and such a rule of construction would also seem in step
with the probable inclinations of the average testator, had he considered the possibility of an adoption, especially in view of present
social conditions and needs.
87 452

S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1970).

NoTs

1971]

Hopefully when the question again comes before the Court, serious

consideration will be given to the approach outlined above. If, however, the Court continues to ignore the need for immediate reform,
the General Assembly should respond by enacting appropriate legislation.8
V. RiGrrs oF

ADuLT ADopr__s

Although, as previously discussed, the adoption processes are
historically, and perhaps validly, geared toward the effective integration of a minor adoptee into a new family unit, adult adoptions have
sought recognition under the same statutory and common law criteria.
However, the advent of the adult adoption did not automatically
warrant an immediate and comfortable niche in the existing rules
and regulations. Three general areas seemed to have generated most
of the difficulties in this area.
The first problem encountered was the lack of statutory directives
authorizing adult adoptions and the ensuing confusion among the
various courts attempting some rational solution.8 9 Another difficult
question was presented once the adult's adoption was approved,
namely, his inheritance rights, both from and through his adoptive
parents. 90 But his adoption and later allowance as an heir generated
still a third problem; his age as a determinative factor in closing out
the class of beneficiaries taking under a given document.91 Although
ancillary difficulties have also arisen, the scope of the present discussion will be limited to an analysis of these major problems and
their various judicial solutions.
Adult adoptions encompass a wide spectrum of motives, yet legislatures have done little to provide regulatory measures that reflect
and control these motivations. Inasmuch as adoption is a legislative
creation, the effective adult adoption must therefore depend, for the
most part, on the local statutes designed for the minor adoptee.
Initial legislative provisions couched their intended meaning in
generic terms such as "children" 92 without suitable definition. 93 Their
88

See proposed statute in appendix to this note.

89 See generally, Annot., 21 A.L.R.8d 1012 (1970).

90 Id.

91 Id.
92 MMA.-W.BsTER NEW INTEBNATIONAL DICTiONARY

388 (8d ed. 1961)
defined the term "child" to include a "young person of either sex esp. between
infancy and youth," and also "a son or a daughter: a male or female descendant in
the first degree." Although a legislature might intend only the former meaning, a
statute speaking only in terms of adoption of "children" is equivocal in the absence
of some additional explanation or of some mandatory provision which would seem
absurd if applied to adult adoptions. But since the prospective adoptee is not the
(Continued on next page)
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main import, of course, seemed to be that only minors were intended.
But in 1871, 94 a revision of the Massachusetts law permitted adult
adoptions as well. Although Vermont had such a provision as early
as 1873,9- the Massachusetts revision should be noted, for at its base
was an attempt to resolve the obvious difficulties of poor choices of
description, such as "children".9 In spite of the early initiative shown
by Massachusetts and Vermont, other states were slow to follow with
97
like legislation. By 1952, only 34 states permitted adult adoptions
and in 1958 only three additional jurisdictions were added to these
ranks. 98 Today 43 states99 and the District of Columbia 0 0 either
specifically allow such action or impliedly permit the same through
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

adopter's "child" (in terms of relationship) until after the adoption has taken place,
it is logically arguable that a legislature intends only the first definition (based on
age restriction when it refers to adoption) "of a child" rather than "as a child."
93 In Alabama, for example, the question of interpretation has produced
recurring problems for some 80 years. See Doby v. Carroll, 147 So.2d 803 (Ala.
1962),
noted in 15 ALA. L. REv. 545 (1963).
94
MASS. GEN. LAws

1836-1953, cli. 324, at 752 (1954). For a discussion of

the Massachusetts law and others enacted before 1876, see W. WHMmoRE, THE
LAw OF ADOPTION IN THE UNrrED STATES, AND ESPECrALLY MASSACHUSETTS

(1876). MASS. ACTS 1871, ch. 310, § 6 at 654, contained the proviso that: "A
person of adult age may be adopted in lie manner upon his own consent, without
other9 consent
or notice."
5
VT. ACTS No. 50, § 1, at 42-43 (1873).
9
6WE'rrmoRE, supranote 94, at 74.
97 See note, 38 VA. L. REv. 544, 552-53 (1952). One additional state permitted adult adoption in limited circumstances. Id. at 553. Because of the previously
discussed equivocal language of some of the statutes, it is difficult to make a clear
head count of the positions of the states at any given date, though this is becoming
less of a problem. In 1935, about 30 states seemed to permit adoption of adults.
4 C. VEmNnm,
Am2mucA_ Ftmy LAw 284 (1936).
98
See note, 1958 WAsH. U.L.Q. 97, 106-10.
99
ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.140 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-121 (Supp. 1967);
CAL. Crv. CODE § 227p (West 1954); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-4 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-67 (Supp. 1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 951-56
(1953); FLA.STAT. ANN. § 63.231 to -.281 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-420
(Supp. 1967); IDAmo CODE ANN. § 16-1501 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4,
§ 9.1-3 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-124 (Repl. Vol. 1968); IowA
CODE ANN. § 600.1 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2101 (1964); Ky.REv.
STAT. § 405.390 (1966); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9.461 (1965); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 531 (Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 71 (Repl. Vol. 1966);
MAss. ANN. LAws Ch.210, § 1 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (1959);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 1269-02 (Recomp. Vol. 1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.010
(1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-139, -140 (1962); NEv. REv. STAT. §
127.190 (1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 461:9 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:22-1 to -3 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-13 (1953); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw
§ 109-111 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-36 (Supp. 1967)- N.D.CENT.
CODE § 14-11-01 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.21 (1966); On. REV.
STAT. § 109-329 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1(d), 2.1 (1963); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 15-7-4 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.18 (Supp. 1967); TENN.
CoDE ANN. § 36-138 (Supp. 1968); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46b-1 (1959);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-30-1 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 431 (1958);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-222 (1968); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.32.020 (1961);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-7 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 322.01 (1958); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-726 (1957).
100 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-301, 303, 304 (1967).
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broadly phrased statutes. While three of these jurisdictions permit
adult adoption only in restrictive circumstances, 101 the seven which
do not permit such action are characterized not by proscriptive language, but merely by explicit provisions for minors alone. 0 2 In addition, the Uniform Adoption Act, specifically includes a provision for
03
adult adoption.
The procedural formalities requisite in the adult adoption are
much less rigid than those for minors. Usually the investigation of
the adopters home' 0 4 and the requirement that the adoptee live for a
period of time with the adopter are waived. 10 5 The consent of the
adoptee's natural parents is no longer in issue 06 and the confidentiality
101 Idaho provides for adoption of adults only in cases where such adoption
did not occur during the minority of such adopted person by reason of inadvertence,
mistake or neglect and the person adopting has sustained the relation of parent to
such adopted person for a continuing period of more than fifteen years. IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 16-1501 (Supp. 1967). Virginia permits adoption of an adult if:
(1) the adopter is the adoptee's stepparent and has stood in loco parentis for at
least one year; or (2) the adoptee is a niece or nephew of the adopter, has no
living parents, and has lived in the adopter's home at least one year- or (3) the
adoptee resided in the home of the adopter for at least five years before reaching
age twenty-one. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-222 (Repl. Vol. 1968). New Mexico provides only for adoption of a childless, unmarried adult who is twenty years younger
than the adopter. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-13 (1963).
Until 1967 Utah provided that an adult could not be adopted unless both his
parents were dead. This was amended to permit adoption of an adult. UTA CODE
ANN. § 78-30-1 (Supp. 1967).
102 Ar A. CODE tit. 27, § 1-9 (Supp. 1967); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-101 to
-110
(Supp. 1967);
HxwArI
Rxv. 1968);
LAws § 331-1 to -16 (1955); MicH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.8178(541)
to (554)
(Supp.
NuB. 3Ev. ST.AT. § 48-101 to 116 (Supp.
1967);
Om~o
3Ey.
CoDe
ANN.
§
3107.01 to .14 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CoDE SEC.
14.0401 to .0408 (Stiopp. 1969).
103 Section 18 of the UNIFoIQ.I ADOPTION ACr provides: "An adult person may
be adopted by any other adult person [at least ten years older than the person
adopted] with the consent of the person to be adopted or his guardian, and with
the consent of the spouse, if any, of a sole adoptive parent, ified in writing with
the court."
As to the criteria for granting such an adoption, the section adds that: "After
a hearing on the petition and after such investigation as the court deems advisable,
if the court finds that it is to the best interests of the persons involved, a decree of
adoption may be entered. . " Under the Act, adoption of an adult produces the
same civil effects between adopter and adoptee as does the adoption of a minor.
Many of the procedural requirements for effecting adoption of a minor are
suspended, however, if the adoptee is an adult. Although the UNrwo~mu ADOPTION
Acr has been enacted by only two states, it unquestionably has had a significant
impact on the comparable statutory provisions in many other states.
104 Most frequently the statutes either dispense with an investigation or
provide
that it will be discretionary with the court. But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
.439 (1958).

106 This requirement still remains for some or all adult adoptions in a few
states, including Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. For a judicial discussion of
what amounts to such a "residing with" see In re Adoption of Russell, 85 A.2d
878, 881-83
(Pa. Super. 1952).
100 The need for parental consent has not been totally eliminated. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.261 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 4 § 9.1-8 (SmithHurd Supp. 1967). But in the largest group of statutes permitting adult adoption,
only the consent of the adoptee and perhaps the adopter's spouse is required. At
(Continued on next page)
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of the proceedings is naturally de-emphasized.10 7 Decrees are normally
obtained after a single hearing 08 instead of the usual six months wait
required for the adoption of the minor child. 10 9
However, the adult adoptive processes, even though they eventually
gained accepted procedural norms, soon clashed with the law of
future interests." 0 The "rules of convenience";" evolved patterns of
property disposition, crystallized long before the adoption laws and
were attuned without regard for adult adoption participation in class
gifts." 2 For accepting the adult's status as an adoptee, the courts
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

least one state permits consent to be given by the guardian of the proposed adoptee
who is incompetent. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-726 (1957). Usually the statutory
requirements as to who must be given notice are the same as those for consent.
1or Some of the statutes leave it unclear whether confidentiality requirements
for minor adoptions apply to adult adoptions. The use of "child" in such provisions
again can be the source of the confusion. In some jurisdictions, however, confidentiality provisions clearly differ according to the adoptee's age at the time
of adoption. See, e.g., LA. 1REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:461 (1965).
10S In Louisiana the adult adoption is accomplished by a notarial act signed
by the adopter and adopted party. LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 9:461 (1965); Wadlington, Adoption of Adults in Louisiana, 40 TuL. L. 1,Ev. 1, 6-10 (1965). Nevada
requires only a written agreement which is approved by the district court in the
county where either the adopter or adoptee resided. NEv. R1v. STAT. § 127.190
(1965). In Connecticut such an adoption is effected by a written agreement approved by the court of probate after a judicial hearing. CoNN. GENr. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-47 (Supp. 1968).
109 A good illustration of this contrast is seen in the UNrFonm ADoPTON Acr.
In the case of adoption of a minor, § 11 specifically requires both an interlocutory
and a final decree with a suggested time lapse of six months between the granting
of the former and the application of the latter. For adult adoptions, § 18 replaces
with a single hearing.
this requirement
0
11 See generally SIms, HANDBOOK ONro LAw oF Fur~unE ItnmRs, (2d
ed. 1966). An excellent, brief summary of the rules was stated by Astbury, J., in
In Re Charteres,1 Cr. 466, 471 (1927) as follows:
The rule may be divided into three heads, first, if there is an immediate gift
in the will to A's children the rule lays down that only those children in existence
at the testator's death shall take, although his intention was obviously different.
By way of exception to this first head, if there are no children of A in existence at
the testator's death then the rule of convenience ceases to operate, and all subsequently born children take in accordance with the testator's intention. The second
head of the rule may be stated as follows: If the gift is in futuro, as for instance
to A for life with remainder to B's children, the rule provides that only those
children of B shall take who come into existence before A's death. Here again there
is an exception that if there are no children of B in esse before A's death, the rule
ceases to operate, and all subsequently born children take. The third head may be
stated as follows: Where there is a gift to A for life and after his death to B's
children who attain twenty-one, then if at A's death there are children of B who
have attained twenty-one or the representatives of such children, the rule applies
and the class closes. If at A's death there are only infant children of B who subsequently attain twenty-one then again the class closes when the first child so attains
that age; and in all cases the rule is excluded if there is an express intention of
the testator to the contrary.
111 See generally, Casner, Class Gifts to Others Than to "Heirs" or "Next of
Kin" Increase in the Class Membership, 51 HAuv. L. 1Ev. 254 (1937).
112 Note, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 332 (1922). The first
Acr,
English statute on adoption was enacted in 1926. AnoPzioN oF CnmDrN
16 & 17 Geo. 5, c.29 (1926).
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still had to contend with what, if anything, could such an adoptee
inherit. It should be noted at the outset that inheritance from the
adoptive parent presents no difficulties, regardless of generic description of the devisees or legatees; only where the proposed claim is a
gift through the adoptive parents is there a dispute.113 Interpretive
battles centered around the generic terminology used in the various
statutes, and decisions accordingly varied with the terminology. The
prime areas of dispute centered, on one hand, over the terms "issue,
"heir", and "heir at law" and on the other hand, over "child" or
,,children,,.114
Decisions allowing "heirs", "heir at law" and "issue" to participate
in class gifts through their adoptive parents have generally done so
on the grounds that one of the purposes of adoption is to make the
adoptee eligible to receive such gifts."*5 This rationale is bolstered
when one considers that the terms themselves more aptly connote legal
relationships than the lay terms of "child" or "children". Since the
adoption has legal efficacy, its attendant privileges should also be
recognized. The pertinent cases seem to stress that the testator could
have easily excluded adoptees with an express provision.11
However, a contrary line of reasoning is prevalent. The rationale
here is based on the testator's probable intent evidenced by the
particular document in question, and on the further assumption that,
the testamentary scheme did not
absent specific inclusive directives,
7
foresee a stranger in blood."
Interestingly enough, the fact situation in a Mississippi case, First

NationalBank of Kansas City v. Sullivan," 8 lent itself to both rationales.

There the testator designated that the trust corpus was to go to his
daughter's "heirs of the body," in default of which the corpus was to
go to the testators "heirs of law." The court felt that the testator's
intention and preference was to exclude an adult adoptee as an "heir
113 Supra,note 89, at § 14.

114 Supra, note 89, at §§ 8, 9, 14 and 18.
115 Supra, note 89 at § 14. Most cases have recognized such a motive and generally concur that this does not affect the validity of the adoption. Early examples

are Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518 (Mass. 1898) and Sheffleld v. Franklin,
44 So. 373 (Ala. 1907).
116 Cf. Brock v. Dorman, 98 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1936); St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1934).
117 Old Colony Trust v. Wood, 74 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1947); Nickerson v.
Hoover, 115 N.E. 588 (Ind. 1917); Wyeth v. Stone, 11 N.E. 729 (Mass. 1887).
The recent decision in Schaefer v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 160 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa
1968) added that while "heirs" has a general meaning under the statute of descent
and distribution, the general intent, as gathered from the instrument, is actually
controlling. Accord, Mason v. Wood, 117 S.E.2d 661 (Va. 1961). These cases
also reflect the presumption that the adult adoptees are excluded unless specifically
included.
118 394 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1965).
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of the body" but included the same as one of the testator's "heirs
at law." 119
Further confusion over the adult adoptee's inheritance rights resulted in semantic games with the terms "child" or "children". Courts
favoring inclusion for gift purposes contend that the adult is the
legal child of the adopted parent, albeit the usual familial setting is
absent. They generally accept the adult adoptee for gift distribution
120
unless a contrary intent expressly appears in the document.
However, other courts argue that the contrary intent is present
merely by the use of the word "child" maintaining that a testator
would use the term only with reference to its lay meaning, not con2
templating its effect under a legal fiction.'1
A. The New York Rule
At this juncture, two New York cases should be analyzed; although they are not directly concerned with adult adoption, their
resolutions have direct application. Widely used interpretations of
the problematic generic terms were announced in In re Estate of
Park122 where the New York Court of Appeals stated:
A testator or settler must know that in the light of New York policy
a foster child has exactly the same 'legal relation" to the parent
as a natural child. In the absence of an explicit purpose stated in
the will or a trust instrument to exclude such a child, he must be
deemed included, whether the word "heir", "child", "issue" or
other 23generic term expressing the parent-child relationship is
used.
The Park decision set the stage for the much celebrated controversy
of In re Silberman's Will.1 24 The facts there involved competing claims

to several million dollars held in trust. In 1950 the testatrix executed
her will, leaving in trust one-half of her residuary estate for the
benefit of her "grandchildren" or 'lawful children of my said sons,"
119

"Our conclusion is that the will bespeaks an intention and preference...
. . to the exclusion of adopted person,
if Alice left heirs of her body; but if Alice died without bodily heirs, it was his
intention to open up the distribution to the broader and more inclusive class "heirs
at law'.... Id. at 283.
120 Delaney v. First Natl Bank, 386 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1963); In re Stanford's
Estate,
121315 P.2d 681 (Calif. 1957).
In re Conley's Estate, 218 A.2d 175 (N.J. 1966); In re Nicors Trust 241
N.Y.2d 775 (1963). Accord, In re Freemans Estate, 40 Pa. Super. 31 (1909)
where the use of the word idn' excluded the adult adoptee.
122 207 N.E.2d 859 (N.Y. 1965).
123 Id. at 860-61.
124242 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1968).

to distribute the portion of the trust estate.

NoTF~s
the class closing when "any of my lawful grandchildren should survive
25
to and attain the age of twenty-one (21) years."1
The testatrix was survived by two sons, Marvin and Samuel, and
three natural grandchildren: Janet and John, Marvin's children and
Alfred, Samuers child. In 1955 Peter was born to Samuel and his
wife Leslie. In 1956, Samuel adopted Douglas and Rita Frates, his
wife's children by a previous marriage. Samuel and Leslie were
divorced in 1960 and shortly thereafter he married Lois. In 1965,
Samuel adopted Allen and Jane Herskovity, children of Lois by her
26
previous marriage.
The Appellate Division, sustaining the trial court, excluded all
the adopted children from participation in the trust.12 7 Using the
test outlined in Park,they concluded that the exclusion of the adoptees
was explicitly intended by the testatrix through her designation of
the class member as "grandchildren." The Court of Appeals rejected
this approach by simply stating that "grandchildren," means "children
of my children," 28 thus satisfying the Park requisite of any "other
29
generic term expressing the parent-child relationship."
So the court seems to have ruled out all the technical distinctions
conjured up to displace the adoptee. However, the New York Court
is still applying a mechanical rule, a rule that may prove inapplicable
in the adult adoptee situation. For in the adult adoption, where the
sole objectives are gift rights, the summary inclusion under the
Silberman test may violate the testators real intent.
What seems to be an underlying and as important a basis for the
possible exclusion of the adoptees would be the fear of possible consequences of a premature closing of the class. Two questions of first
impression 30 should be considered: (1) Should adoptees ever be
included in a class where their inclusion may cause the class to
prematurely close? (2) If said adoptees are included for gift distribution, must their lives be considered for purposes of class closing
as well? The lower court in Silberman primarily explored the potential
fraud in adopting an adult in order to close the class and cut off later
natural-born children. This argument was rejected by the New York
Court of Appeals with the following reasoning:
125 Id. at 789.
126 Id. at 737.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 740.

1290 Id.
13 In the most comprehensive contemporary study of the problems raised by

the adopted child's inclusion or exclusion from class gifts, no mention is made of
the problem herein considered. See Oler, Construction of Private Instruments
Where Adopted Children are Concerned. 43 Mica. L. Rayv. 705, 901 (1945).
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The fallacy of this argument is that it assumes that the possibility of an unusual happening of the nature above mentioned automatically converts the aforesaid provision . . . into an expression
of an illicit purpose to exclude adopted children. It must be borne
in mind that the rule of Park is that adopted children are included
in the absence of an expression of a specific intent to exclude
adopted children. Certainly, the provision.
for the closing of
the class of beneficiaries does not meet that requirement, it does
not mention adopted children and it is not by itself expressive of
an intent to exclude adopted children. All that can be said for
the provision for the closing of the class, and all that has been said
by the surrogate is that, if adopted children were permitted to
share in the trust... [t]he possibility exists that an adoption might
exclude natural born children.
The formula for the closing of the class creates an arbitrary
standard and inequities are always possible in such case. However, the possibility of an inequity, especially one so remote as
that suggested in the opinion of the surrogate, resulting from the
provision for the closing of a class of beneficiaries, should not cause
such provision to be read as an expression 31of an illicit purpose to
exclude adopted children from such class.'
As it turned out, Janet, Marvin's oldest child, closed the class in
1964 when she attained the age of 21; thereby cutting off any possibility that the court's "remote inequity" would operate to unjustly
exclude potential class members. Indeed, the court's reasoning is
simply supported by normal modes of reality. Since parents of a 21year-old child seldom have after born children and it is most likely
that parents who do adopt will do so during the normal child-bearing
period of their marriage, chances are actually slim that adoptees
who close the class will cause prejudicial exclusions.
However, the remote inequity is a present fact in the adult adoption since under any gift set up with the usual reference to age of
majority, the class will automatically close with the adoption. Whether
or not the closing is prejudicial depends upon the facts of each case.
The silence of New York and other jurisdictions leaves the question
unanswered, 13 2 but it can be inferred, from the New York court's
dwelling upon the "remoteness" of that possibility, that the result
would not be contrary to the Silberman decision.
B. The Kentucky Rule
The interpretation and construction complexities of adult adoptions
did not bypass our local forum; for Kentucky has actually become
In re Silberman's Will, 242 N.E.2d 736, 740 (N.Y. 1968).
132 Oler, supra note 130. (The closing of the class problem in New York was
131

discussed here but only with reference to minor adoptions; no reform has ever
extended the discussion to adult adoptions).
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the locus for such actions. The Court has generally seemed to indulge
in the usual technical distinctions over the generic terms and their
varying rationales, and resultant applications have run the gamut.
It should be noted at the outset that until 1966, the Kentucky courts
had no specific statutory directives in adult adoptions, but merely
133
operated by analogy from the statutes for adoption of minors.
However, the statute finally enacted failed to provide sufficiently
explicit directions, in gift construction, to actually aid the court's
determinations. 134 In light of the amazing results the court has
reached over the years in attempting to solve this problem, a detailed
analysis of the important decisions will be delineated.
The earliest notable case, Woods v. Crump,135 had to be decided
in absence of any specific statutory directives in adult adoptions.
The court found itself faced with the construction of a deed leaving
property to the grantor's daughter for life, and at daughter's death
136
to the grantors "heirs and children."
Forty years after the execution of the deed and five years before
the death of the life tenant, the life tenant adopted a 32-year-old
man. The adoptee's share, if any, under the deed was the problem
facing the court. Although the deed spoke of both children and heirs,
which could presumably be interpreted to include both blood relatives
known to the grantor plus any strangers taking via descent and distribution, the court felt constrained to deny the claim of the adoptee.
Utilizing the common law construction of the general statute in force
the court concluded that an adoptee may inherit from his adoptive
parents but not through them. The policy motive advanced by the
court seemed to be that it would thwart the intention of the grantor
to embrace in the term of "heirs" a "stranger in blood" 137 adopted after
the instrument's execution.
The Woods rule was later concisely restated in Copeland v. State
Bank and Trust Company,1 38 where the Court categorically stated
that not only the words "issue" and "heirs," presumed to refer to only
blood relatives, but that any person adopted after a testator's death
will automatically not be included unless a contrary intent is evidenced
133 See supra note 66 for an example
134 IKRS § 405.390 provides:

of such statute.

An adult person over twenty-one years of age may be ado pted in the same
manner as provided by law for adoption of a child and with the same
legal effect, except that his consent alone to such adoption shall be
required.
135 142 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1940).
136 Id. at 681.
137 Id. at 683.
138 188 S.W.2d 1017 (Ky. 1945).
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by the testator. The Kentucky rule at this stage seemed to be
soundly geared towards effectuating the testators intent. However,
Copeland was soon to be limited. In Isaacs v. Manning,'89 the presumption was changed so that "heirs" would include adoptees unless
a contrary intent was evidenced by the testator. Then, in Major v.
Kammer,140 the Court announced that inheritance through as well as
from adoptive parents was possible, adding that adoptees were to be
considered as included within the designation of "heirs" or "heirs at
law" unless a contrary intent was shown.
This line of cases set the stage for what is probably one of the
more bizzare situations to reach the Court of Appeals. In Bedinger v.
Craybilrs Executor and Trustee'41 the adoption in question was
tantamount to a fraud upon the testator. In August, 1914, the will
of Luella Graybill set up a trust for her son, Robert, as life tenant,
with remainder as follows:
After the death of my said son, I direct that the trust estate in the
hands of the Trustees be paid over and distributed by the Trustees
to the heirs at law of my said son, Robert E. Graybill, according
to the law of Descent142and Distribution in force in Kentucky at
the time of his death.
In 1941, some 18 years after the testator's death, Robert, then 58
and his wife, then 45, were without children. Not wanting to see
the trust estate by-pass him, Robert hastened to adopt his wife. The
judgment recited that she was adopted "as his legal heir at law and
child and after this date she shall be deemed to all legal intents and
purposes the legal heir of said Robert E. Graybill." In 1955, when
Robert died his wife sought the corpus of the trust.
The Court approached the Graybill anomaly with a strict eye to
the statutory delineations and applicable precedent in an effort to
circumvent the claim. However, the claim was to survive, even
though surrounded by an aura of what the layman would call "technicality." For under the Kammer test, the testator did not express a
clear intent to exclude adoptees. 143 Moreover, the applicable statutes
mandated that not only should "heir at law" be construed as including
adoptees but also that adult adoptions were clearly approved without
restriction. 144 In a last ditch effort, the Court even vainly looked to
189 227 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1950).
140 258 S.W.2d 506 Ky. 1953).
141 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
142 Id. at 596.
148
Id.
44
'
The use of the words "heirs at law" plus the absence of an express exclusion
were decisive. 302 S.W.2d 594, 598-99. In addition, the court replied on the early
(Continued on next page)
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see if the relationship was possibly incestuous. 145 However, all was
to no avail and the wife was awarded the trust corpus.
Any remaining restrictions on adopted adults were lifted by
Edmands v. Tice1 46 which expressly overruled Copeland. The Court
emphatically stated that adoptees could inherit through as well as
from their adoptors and that the term "children" implied no intent to
exclude adoptees.
Following a six year pause in such litigation, the Court in Wilson
v. Johnson147 was again called upon to construe a wife-adoption situation. Evidently, however, a perusal of its earlier decision caused the
Court to re-evaluate its position as possibly being abortive of the basic
intent of the trust documents. The Court was now faced with trust
provisions that read:
...when

the youngest of said children, the mother and the father

being dead, shall become twenty-one (21), this trust shall terminate and the principal shall then be 148
divided equally between the
children of Leslie living at that time.

Straining to differentiate this situation from Graybill, the Court
employed a distinction possibly as ingenious as the wife adoption
itself. Utilizing the old conceptions that the terms "child" and "heir"
inherently should vary in application, the court found that a difference
existed between the instant document and Graybill, at least technically. However, the Court of Appeals was still troubled with
rulings that the generic terms held no significance. 1 49 Reluctant to
overturn such authority, the Court at last found the loophole. They
reasoned that an adopted child becomes the natural child of the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

case of Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 295 S.W. 896 (Ky. 1927). The case dealt with a
wealthy bachelor's adoption of his married stenographer. Although no problem
existed over the class gift through the adoptive parents, the adoption itself was
collaterally attacked because it was merely a tool of testamentary disposition. However, the rationale applied was as follows:
...In fact an adoption solely for the purpose of inheriting does not have
for its purpose, nor is it followed by, any change in social or domestic
relationship of either party to the transaction, but has for its purpose and
effect only the bestowal on the adoptee the right of a natural heir to
inherit undisposed of property from the adopted ancestor....

Id. at 897.

Another interesting case aptly lends itself to this discussion. Stevens v.
Halstead, 181 App. Div. 198, 168 N.Y.S. 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917) was in
opposition to Greene v. Fitzpatrick in saying that the court would not be induced
into approving the relationship of an "adulteress and her aged and infirmed
paramour." Id. at 144.
145 302 S.W.2d at 600. The court rejected this argument because there was no
consanguinty of blood between Graybill and his wife.
146 324 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1959).
147 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965).
148 Id. at 635.
149 Id. at 635-36.
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adopter, and is for all purposes, a child. On the other hand, while
an adopted adult becomes the natural child of the adopter, he is still
an adult. Accordingly, if a testator uses the word "children," he
necessarily means to include only those under the commonly accepted
thereof; otherwise he would have used the words "heir" or
meaning
"issue."150 The Court then essentially overruled Edmonds, but carefully phrased their opinion so as not to affect the rights of minor
adoptees.
The Court reinforced their position in Pennington v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank and Trust Company' 51 by staunchly holding to their
"child versus heir" distinction. 152 However, the triumph was shortlived, for in Minary v. Citizen's Fidelity Bank & Trust Company, 53
the distinguishing factor disappeared. The testrix left the trust to
her husband and three sons, terminating upon the death of the last
surviving beneficiary, with the distribution as follows:
remaining portion ... shall be distributed to my then
[T]he
[..
of descent and distribution
surviving heirs, according to the 5laws
4
then in force in Kentucky ....
A la Graybill, one of the sons later adopted his wife and she
claimed under the trust at the death of the last beneficiary. The use
of the word "heirs" was the same as in Graybill, so the Wilson
doctrine was inapplicable. Instead of trying to evade the issues
through more skillful sidestepping, the Court decided to tackle the
situation head on. It recognized the adoption as
. . . an act of subterfuge in effect thwarts the intent of the
ancestor whose property is being distributed and cheats the
rightful heirs. 155
At this point, the choice had to be made between carrying out
the strict provisions of the applicable statutes' 5 and giving effect
to the intent of the testator. The court reasoned that the statutes were
merely tools under which theoretically, the testators intent would be
fulfilled. The Court thereby concluded:
150 Id. at 636.
151 390 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1965).
152 Under this most interesting fact situation a 71-year-old wife adopted her
74 year-old-husband so that he could take under his wife's mother's will which
devised the remainder of the estate to "the child or children of my daughter Annie,
if any." The court merely stated that the husband was not a child. Id. at 672.
153 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967).
154 Id. at 341.
'55 Id. at 343.
156 KRS § 199.520(2), supra note 66; KRS § 405.390, supra note 134,

NoTEs
When one rule of law does violence to another it becomes inevitable that one must then give way to the other. It is of paramount importance that man be permitted to pass on his property
at his death to those who represent the natural objects of his
bounty. This is ancient and precious right running from the dawn
of civilization in an unbroken line down to the present day. Our
adoption statutes are humanitarian in nature and of great importance to the welfare of the public. However, these statutes
should not be given a construction that does violence to the above
rule and to the extent that they violate the rule and prevent one
from passing on his property in accord with his wishes, they must
give way. Adoption of an adult for the purpose of bringing that
person under the provisions of a preexisting testamentary instrument when he clearly was not intended to be so covered should
not be permitted and we do not view this as doing any great
1 57
violence to the intent and purpose of your adoption laws.

It is interesting to note that the strain of reasoning running

through the court's decision seems to duplicate the rationale in the
earliest such case-Woods v. Crump. 158 In both, adult adoptees were
not allowed inheritance through their adoptors and from a preexisting
instrument where it was apparent that the testator did not intend
to include such a "stranger in blood". It also seems ironic that the
Kentucky Court of Appeals took almost 30 years to return essentially
to the same decision reached in 1940. But at least the court has
discarded the traditional strict rule analysis approach in favor of a
more flexible and equitable determination of justice for the parties.
The Court has also apparently taken a vanguard step in essentially
rewriting the pertinent statute; the legislature specifically directed
that the adult adoption would have the same legal effect as would the
adoption of a minor child. 159 Yet the Court expressly states that the
treatment of the adult should be different than the minor and actually
formulates a separate set of criteria to judge the adult's rights.
It seems then, at this point, that the strict analysis of generic
terms is past history insofar as adult adoptions are concerned. But
we should remember that these generic term disputes were first
generated by the distinction between inheritance from and inheritance
through the adopted parent. The Court had accordingly tried to
ascertain and delineate the inheritance rights under the various wills
and trusts with this problem in mind using the statute as primary
0
reference, 16
and until Minary it was unable to shake off the statutory
157 419 S.W.2d at 848-44.
158 See n. 185 and accompanying text.
159
0 See KRS § 405.840, supra note 184.
16
In each Kentucky case previously discussed, the court looked to the applicable statute to ascertain the status of the generic term in question.
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technicalities and relate to more logical and equitable criteria, namely
the intent of the testator or grantor.
However, these sundry machinations could have been summarily
avoided had the Court stopped to analyze one fundamental principle
of law viz: the statutory criteria apply only to intestate succession;
in construing a will or a trust, the statutes are inapplicable except
insofar as they may express the public policy of the forum or when
a partial intestacy results. This is clearly illustrated by the simple
fact that when one receives a gift via a will or trust, he receives
directly from the donor; the termination of a proceding estate in his
adoptive parents serves only to postpone the time of his enjoyment
of that gift. Hence, the from or through distinction with its attendant
confusion is immaterial. 161
Accordingly, in cases 'construing trusts or wills the court should
have first looked to the intent of the testator, relying on the statutes
only for policy considerations. Instead, nearly thirty years of unnecessary confusion resulted when the Court missed this self-evident
shortcut.
As previously noted, New York seems to be the only jurisdiction
to consider the affect of adult adoption on the beneficial class as a
separate issue. 16 2 The Kentucky Court has not done so because it
has not been confronted with a class gift, the closing of which depends
upon the age of the beneficiaries. 63
However, Kentucky's strange application of the rules of convenience'64 presents potential problems akin to those confronted by
the New York courts. The rules operate to close the class where no
specific standard has been set forth in the given document for the
closing. Generally, where nothing is specified, the rules operate to
close the class at the grantor's or testator's death. Where age limits
are prescribed such as "payable at 21," the rules operate to close the
class when the first class member reaches that age. Other ancillary
rules are many, but are unimportant for purposes of this discussion. 165
161-A clear example of this rule is given in Virginia where the statutes explicitly divide the two, the statutory applications being only for intestate succession.
VA. CODE ANNOT. § 63.1-234. Two Virginia cases further point out this difference.
In McFadden v. McNorton, 69 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1952), an adoptee was allowed to
take his intestate share as an "heir' from the estate of his adoptor father's sister;
but in Merson v. Wood, 117 S.E.2d 661 (Va. 1961), the adopted adult was
excluded under a will as an "heir because despite statutory inclusion, the testators
intent was the determining factor. For a general discussion of this principle see

Sims,62supra note

110.

all the Kentucky cases the closing of the class was either dependent
upon the donor's death or the termination of the preceding estate.
163 See supra,n. 110, 111.
1

1n

164 Id.
165 Id.

NOTES

The important distinction to be noted, however, is that Kentucky
does not apply the rules to any situations where family members
comprise the class. Instead, Kentucky here closes the class only at the
termination of the preceding estate. Thus, in the following hypothetical: A to B for life, remainder to "A's heirs" would be determined
at Ns death; in Kentucky, "A's heirs" would not be determined until
the termination of the preceding life estate or at B's death. This
strange application has generated some of the Kentucky decisions
previously discussed, since if A's death were the determining factor,
later adopted adults would be automatically excluded from class
participation. The use of the grantors or testator's death as the
measuring point would accordingly result in an easier construction
of his intent since he would have presumably known of the adoption
before his death; the "stranger in blood" would no longer be a
"stranger" in these cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The basic premise of construction in adoption cases involving
both minors and adults is that different treatment should be accorded
intestate succession and inheritance from a document. The statutes
presently in force apply only directly to intestate cases where the
language may be strictly interpreted. Therefore, when confronted
with a will or a trust, the Court should use the statutes only as a
measure of public policy, with the donor's intent as the primary
decisional base. Kentucky courts, however, have disregarded these
fundamental principles in both the minor and adult adoptions.
In early minor adoption cases, the court vigorously applied these
intestate statutes as determinative criteria for construction of wills
and trusts. The latest cases seem to have qualified this somewhat
by looking to the general intent of the testator, but the court has now
failed to use the statutes as measures of public policy.
The adult adoption situation is not quite as bad. Although early
decisions do evidence heavy reliance on the statutory words, the
court has now shifted to the donor's intent and, at the same time, has
attempted to decide in accordance with the public policy of the
legislation.
However, due to the Court's wanton vacillation in this area, any
objective predictability lapses into conjecture. Assuming that the
Court could be finally prodded into utilizing the correct construction
criteria, there is no guarantee they will continue to do so.
Perhaps the solution lies in specific legislation adapted to the gifts
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via instruments, to supplement the present intestate succession laws.
Accordingly, a model statute along these lines is provided in the
following appendix.
Gerald L. Greene
Michael . Schmitt
APPENDIX
PROPOSED STATUTE
A BILL
To establish in the State of Kentucky regulation of Private Instruments;
Legal Status of Adoptees.

§ 1. The words child, grandchild, issue, heir, heir at law,
kin, heir of the body, descendants and all other generic terms
used or employed in all private instruments to designate members

of a class taking under those instruments shall include any
person adopted into the class as well as and to the same extent
as any person born into the class.
§ 2. In order to exclude an adopted person from the class
participation granted in § 1 an unequivocal statement to that
effect must expressly appear on the face of the instrument.
§ 3. Sub-section (1) and (2) shall apply equally to both
an adopted adult and adopted minor, except that for the adult a
rebuttable presumption to the contrary exists where the adult
either was adopted after the death of the person creating the
gift or was adopted subsequent to the execution of an irrevocable
inter vivos instrument.
§ 4. Where the rebuttable presumption of § 3 arises, the
court shall determine the rights of the adult adoptee with reference to the general intent of the person creating the class gift
as evidenced by the instrument, its execution, general extrinsic
information relative to the creation of the instrument and -with
reference to the general public policy of Kentucky as set out
in this statute.

